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Abstract Is it acceptable andmoral to sacrifice a few people’s
lives to save many others? Research on moral dilemmas in
psychology, experimental philosophy, and neuropsychology
has shown that respondents judge utilitarian personal moral
actions (footbridge dilemma) as less appropriate than equiva-
lent utilitarian impersonal moral actions (trolley dilemma).
Accordingly, theorists (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) have argued
that judgments of appropriateness in personal moral dilemmas
are more emotionally salient and cognitively demanding (tak-
ing more time to be rational) than impersonal moral dilemmas.
Our novel findings show an effect of psychological
accessibility (driven by partial contextual information;
Kahneman, 2003) on utilitarian moral behavior and response
time for rational choices. Enhanced accessibility of utilitarian
outcomes through comprehensive information about moral
actions and consequences boosted utility maximization in
moral choices, with rational choices taking less time.
Moreover, our result suggests that previous results indicating
emotional interference, with rational choices taking more time
to make, may have been artifacts of presenting partial
information.
Keywords Utility .Moral dilemmas . Accessibility .
Judgments . Rational choice
Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people’s lives to
save many others? ‘It is the greatest happiness of the greatest
number that is the measure of right and wrong’. With these
words, the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1970) de-
fined the nature of utilitarian actions: Behaviors judged as
morally right only by virtue of their outcome (Bentham,
1970). From the utilitarian point of view, Bentham (1970)
noted that is acceptable to sacrifice a small number of people’s
lives to save a greater number because this results in greater
utility (happiness) overall. In contrast, deontologists (e.g.,
Kant, 1959) have argued that it is not acceptable, because
living is a fundamental right for everyone, and no one has
the right to take that from anyone, regardless of any benefits
that may arise from doing so. Research in psychology, exper-
imental philosophy, and neuropsychology has revealed that
moral judgments of the appropriateness of life-saving actions
are not strictly utilitarian, but are influenced by the type of
involvement (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley,
& Cohen, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Mikhail, 2007,
2009; Thomson, 1985). In particular, directly taking action
(“personal action”) in scenarios (one person pushing another
from the bridge in order to save several others, in the “foot-
bridge dilemma”) was judged to be less appropriate than in-
directly taking action (“impersonal action”) (a person
“switching a mechanism,” killing one person in order to save
several others, in the “trolley dilemma”).
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Various theoretical attempts have been made to account for
these behavioral differences in response to personal and im-
personal dilemmas. Traditionally, moral- psychology theorists
have focused on the role of emotional processes in moral
judgments (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene
et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Nakamura,
2013; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). For instance, Greene and
colleagues (2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002) found that respon-
dents spent more time judging the appropriateness of personal
moral actions than of impersonal actions. This result seems
puzzling and surprising from a strict utilitarian perspective,
given that the two dilemma types offer identical utility.
In an attempt to provide an account of the above result in
terms of the relationship between implicit and explicit cogni-
tive processes in moral judgments, Greene and colleagues
(2001) proposed a dual-process theory of moral behavior,
stating that moral judgments can be driven via both (i) implic-
it, fast, affective, and (ii) explicit, slow, controlled psycholog-
ical mechanisms (Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Greene et al.,
2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell,
Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). In
Greene’s view, the affective system is likely to be activated
by “personal” moral considerations, while the cognitive sys-
tem might favor utilitarian consequences and thus rational
thinking. This proposal has been supported by behavioral ex-
periments (Greene et al., 2001), testing utilitarian choices in a
morally challenging situation, in which a trolley is riding a rail
and – if it proceeds on its way – five people tied on the track
will be killed. The participants were presented with two dif-
ferent opportunities: in the trolley dilemma, to hit a switch and
make the trolley change its track, killing one person tied to
another rail, or to do nothing and let the five people die; sim-
ilarly, in the footbridge dilemma, to push a person off the
bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will
stop the trolley, saving the five people tied up onto the track, or
to do nothing and let the five people die. The results show that
people judge as appropriate sacrificing one person for the
sake of five in the trolley dilemma, but judge as inappropriate
sacrificing one person in order to save five in the footbridge
dilemma.
According to the moral dual-process model, what makes
the difference between the two types of dilemma is the degree
of personal affective and cognitive involvement. Consistent
with this model, participants took longer to accept (i.e., judge
as appropriate) personal moral actions that would maximize
utilitarian outcomes (rational moral judgments) than to reject
such actions as inappropriate (irrational moral judgments)
(Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002). Greene and
colleagues (2001) argued that when participants faced person-
al (footbridge-like) dilemmas in which one’s moral rules con-
flict with the outcomes, both affective and cognitive systems
were recruited. The former would favor rejecting the actions
for the sake of an internal moral principle; the latter would
favor endorsing them, in the name of rationality. The conflict,
then, between the two systems would result in increased re-
sponse time when a participant faced a footbridge-like dilem-
ma and made a rational judgment.
Crucially, almost all experimental studies based on
Thomson’s (1985) paradigm have tended to use abstract moral
dilemmas framed in such a way that the accessibility
(Kahneman, 2003) of moral utilitarian actions and conse-
quences is reduced, asking respondents to apparently put
themselves into those cognitively challenging situations.
For example:
“…The only way to save the lives of the five workmen
is to hit a switch near the tracks that will cause the trolley
to proceed to the right, where the lone workman’s large
body will stop the trolley. The lone workman will die if
you do this, but the five workmen will be saved.
Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to
avoid the deaths of the five workmen?
Yes/No”
There are two striking issues in these commonly used de-
scriptions of abstract moral dilemmas. First, although there is
an explicit contextual account about the moral action and util-
itarian consequences of saving the five workmen at the ex-
pense of the stranger, there is no corresponding account of
saving the life of the stranger at the expense of the workmen.
Hence, only 50 % of the moral scenario is contextually avail-
able – a framing effect (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981), where different representations of out-
comes make some features of the situation more accessible
and others less accessible, leading to systematically different
decisions. Second, the appropriateness question itself further
adds to this framing effect by requiring an assessment of ap-
propriateness on only one of the two possible moral actions
(“Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the
deaths of the fiveworkmen?”). Given the well-established role
of contextual framing effects in decision-making
(FeldmanHall, Mobbs, Evans, Hiscox, Navrady, &
Dalgleish, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), findings and
interpretation of utilitarian moral decision-making based on
these commonly used scenarios are to be treated with caution.
For the current study, in an attempt to increase the accessi-
bility of moral utilitarian actions and consequences – utilitar-
ian accessibility – we have developed and de-biased abstract
moral scenarios and questions used by researchers in psychol-
ogy, experimental philosophy, and neuroscience.
For example:
“….The only way to save the lives of the five workmen
is to hit a switch near the tracks that will cause the trolley
to proceed to the right, where the lone workman’s large
body will stop the trolley. The lone workman will die if
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you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. The
only way to save the life of the lone workman is not to
hit the switch near the tracks. The five workmen will die
if you do this, but the lone workman will be saved.
Choose the option which is more appropriate for you:
Sacrifice one workman in order to save five workmen
or
Sacrifice five workmen in order to save one workman.”
First, we offer a new experimental approach to study moral
dilemmas by eliminating confounding variables (see, e.g.,
McGuire et al., 2009), allowing the footbridge dilemma to
be impersonal (switching mechanism) and for the trolley di-
lemma to be personal (to push the worker on the track).
Second, to account for utilitarian accessibility we offer presen-
tations of moral dilemmas by using both partial textual de-
scriptions (commonly employed in utilitarian moral research)
and novel full textual descriptions of moral actions and their
consequences. Third, we further reduce differences in utilitar-
ian accessibility by offering a choice question of appropriate-
ness, which accounts for both utilitarian alternatives (and their
consequences) in moral actions (rational and irrational
choice). Accordingly, the results of the current study were
expected to reveal an enhanced behavioral rationality for mor-
al dilemmas with accessible utilitarian content, where a full
textual description was provided about the initial state, action,
and the consequences of the action.
Experiment
Method
Participants
According to power analysis with a significance level = .05,
desired power = .80, and medium effect size (f2 = .25), a total
sample size of 136 was required. Participants were recruited
through a recruitment service of online survey panels. Awin-
dow of 7 days was set for data collection; after a week had
passed, 299 people (170 females, 129 males) had taken part,
meeting the required sample size. Mean age was 49 years (SD
= 14.07). They took part individually and received a payment
of £1. All participants were treated in accordance with the
ethical standards of the British Psychological Society.
Materials and design
Each participant was given one of eight vignettes to read,
involving a moral-dilemma scenario where the type of dilem-
ma, action involvement, task instructions and questions were
manipulated. The experiment accounted for utilitarian acces-
sibility by presenting descriptive information about the moral
dilemmas: (1) by partial text description and question only or
(2) by full textual description and question, revealing all of the
possible behavioral actions and consequences of the actions
(see the supplementary materials).
An independent measures 2 × 2 × 2 design was employed,
with independent variables type of dilemma (trolley dilemma
or footbridge dilemma), action involvement (moral personal or
moral impersonal), and utilitarian accessibility (partial text
description and question or full text description [displayed
information about the initial state, action, and consequences
of the action] and question). The dependent variables were the
choice of appropriateness of action (making a rational or irra-
tional choice), study time (reading the scenarios), and re-
sponse time. Based on the consequentialist theory of moral
utilitarian judgment, in this experiment we defined a rational
choice as one that saves the lives of five workmen rather than
of another single workman, thereby maximizing the utility of
the moral action that is taken and minimizing the disutility.
The order of the response options (rational and irrational) was
counterbalanced across participants.
Procedure
Instructions, scenario, and question were presented in an on-
line computer-based experiment. Participants were presented
with and required to read the instructions and one moral-
dilemma scenario. Then (after clicking the “next” button),
while the moral dilemma was still visible, the respondents
were presented with a binary choice (between actions with
rational or irrational utilitarian consequences) and required
to choose the appropriate option for them.
Results
The effect of the independent variables on choice1 was ana-
lyzed. Rational choices (choosing the option resulting in one
death rather than five) were more commonly made when full
information was presented and when an impersonal dilemma
presented (Table 1 and Fig. 1): A logistic-regression model
comprising all the main effects and interaction effects ex-
plained 38 % of variance, RCS
2 = .38. The main effects of
accessibility (partial information vs. full information), OR (odds
ratio) = 31.67, 95 % confidence interval (CI) 3.95–254.08, and
involvement (impersonal vs. personal), = 0.09, 95 % CI
0.03–0.31, were significant. However, neither the main effect
of dilemma type, OR = 0.55, 95 % CI 0.22–1.37, nor any of
the interaction effects, OR = 1.97, 95 % CI 0.35–10.97, for
dilemma by involvement, OR = 0.24, 95 % CI 0.02–2.56, for
dilemma by accessibility, OR = 1.79, 95 % CI 0.15–21.96, for
involvement by accessibility, and OR = 1.43, 95 % CI 0.07–
1 Irrational choice was the reference category and rational choice was the
response category.
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29.25, for involvement by accessibility were significant.
Therefore, next a model with only the significant main effects
of accessibility and involvement was analyzed. This explained
36 % of variance, RCS
2 = .36. The main effects of accessibility,
OR = 19.26, 95 % CI 10.00–31.11, and involvement, OR =
0.20, 95 % CI 0.10–0.37, remained significant. The odds of a
rational choice were 19.26 times larger when a dilemma was
presented with full information than when it was presented with
reduced information. Furthermore, the odds of a rational choice
were 0.20 times smaller when a dilemma involved a choice of a
personal act (pushing the person) than when it involved an
impersonal act (operating a switch without direct contact with
the person).
Study time for a dilemma with full information was longer
than when partial information was displayed; furthermore,
when involvement was impersonal, time was longer than
when it was personal (Table 2). A 2 × 2 × 2 analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) showed that the main effects of accessibility
(partial vs. full information), F(1, 291) = 13.31, p < .001, ε2 =
.04, and involvement (impersonal vs. personal), F(1, 291) =
5.33, p < .05, ε2 = .01, were significant, but neither the main
effect of dilemma type nor any of the interaction effects, all F
< 1, all ε2 = .01, were significant.
In contrast, response time for a dilemma with full informa-
tion was shorter than when partial information was displayed
(Table 3), t (297) = 5.57, r = .31, p < .001. Further analysis
examined Greene and colleagues’ (2001) claim that “emotional
interference” produces a longer response time for emotionally
incongruent responses. Specifically, the dual-process theory of
moral behavior (Greene et al., 2001) predicts longer response
time for a rational choice in response to a moral dilemma under
the condition of personal involvement than for a rational choice
under the condition of impersonal involvement. However, de-
scriptives indicated that response time was longer for emotion-
ally incongruent response only under the conditions of partial
information (Fig. 2). In support, we conducted 2 × 2 × 2 × 2
ANOVA, with choice rationality (response to the task) as an
additional independent variable. The results show that the main
effect of accessibility, F(1, 283) = 8.59, p < .01, ε2 = .02, and
the interaction effects of involvement by accessibility, F(1,
283) = 5.48, p < .05, ε2 = .01, involvement by choice rational-
ity, F(1, 283) = 14.43, p < .001, ε2 = .04, and accessibility by
choice rationality (rational vs. irrational choice), F(1, 283) =
6.72, p < .05, ε2 = .02, were significant. The main effects of
choice rationality, F(1, 283) = 3.57, p > .05, ε2 = .01, and
involvement and dilemma type were not significant, both F <
1, ε2 = .00. The following were also not significant: the two-
way interaction effects: dilemma type by involvement, dilem-
ma type by accessibility, and dilemma type by choice rational-
ity, all F < 1, ε2 = .00; the three-way interaction effects:
Table 1 Choice as a function of involvement, accessibility, and
dilemma type
Involvement Accessibility
(information)
Trolley Footbridge
Irrational Rational Irrational Rational
Impersonal Partial 6 % 7 % 8 % 5 %
(19) (21) (23) (14)
Full 0 % 12 % 2 % 9 %
(1) (35) (6) (28)
Personal Partial 13 % 1 % 12 % 1 %
(39) (4) (36) (4)
Full 2 % 10 % 4 % 8 %
(5) (29) (11) (24)
Figures are percentages with frequencies in brackets
Fig. 1 Frequencies of rational choices as a function of accessibility,
involvement, and dilemma type
Table 2 Descriptives for study time by involvement, accessibility, and
dilemma type
Involvement Accessibility
(information)
Tr Trolley Footbridge
M SD M SD
Impersonal Partial T 3.23 0.50 3.29 0.60
U 28.43 14.27 31.38 17.28
Full T 3.40 0.53 3.43 0.54
U 34.55 20.65 36.46 27.16
Personal Partial T 3.12 0.44 3.15 0.46
U 21.63 8.74 25.56 9.85
Full T 3.36 0.47 3.35 0.50
U 30.01 12.49 32.10 16.86
The frequency distribution of study time was positively skewed and this
was considerably improved by logarithmic transformation
Tr transformation, T logarithmically transformed, U untransformed
(original)
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dilemma type by involvement by choice rationality,F(1, 283) =
1.07, p > .05, ε2 = .00, involvement by accessibility by choice
rationality, F(1, 283) = 1.59, p > .05, ε2 = .00, and dilemma
type by involvement by accessibility and dilemma type by
accessibility by choice rationality, both F < 1, ε2 = .00; and
the four-way interaction, F < 1, ε2 = .00.
Follow-up simple-effect tests showed that for moral di-
lemmas with partial information, the interaction between in-
volvement and choice rationality was significant, F(1, 159) =
15.60, p < .001, ε2 = .09. Unsurprisingly, further simple effects
within partial information revealed that the effect of choice
rationality was significant, F(1, 82) = 8.69, p < .01, ε2 = .09,
when involvement was personal, with rational choices taking
more time to make (MLn = 2.81; SDLn = .38) than irrational
(MLn = 2.16; SDLn = .61); however, when involvement was
impersonal, the effect was significant, F(1, 76) = 8.56, p <
.01, ε2 = .09, with rational choices taking less time (MLn =
2.03; SDLn = .52) than irrational (MLn = 2.51; SDLn = .84).
However, simple effects showed that for moral dilemmas
with full information only the effect of choice rationality was
significant, F(1, 138) = 10.69, p < .01, ε2 = .06, with rational
choices taking less time (MLn = 1.79; SDLn = .49) than irratio-
nal (MLn = 2.19; SDLn = .46). These findings suggest that any
emotional interference, with rational choices taking more time
to make, appears as an artifact of presenting partial informa-
tion and disappears when full information is presented, with
rational choices taking less time.
Discussion
Our results reveal that variation in utilitarian accessibility pro-
duces variation in moral choices. In particular, displaying full
information regarding moral actions and consequences result-
ed in an increase of rational choices. Moreover, the effect of
utilitarian accessibility was general in that it occurred across
types of involvement (both personal and impersonal) and
types of dilemma (both trolley and footbridge). Previous re-
search (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) found that people took more
time to judge an action as rational when a moral dilemma was
personal. However, type of dilemma and involvement were
confounded (McGuire et al., 2009), and utilitarian accessibil-
ity was not manipulated.
Table 3 Descriptives for response time by involvement, accessibility,
and dilemma type
Involvement Accessibility
(information)
Tr Trolley Footbridge
M SD M SD
Impersonal Partial T 2.28 0.74 2.30 0.76
U 13.43 13.88 13.15 9.57
Full T 1.85 0.52 1.89 0.54
U 7.25 3.92 7.62 4.14
Personal Partial T 2.16 0.60 2.29 0.63
U 10.51 7.25 12.19 8.76
Full T 1.85 0.50 1.86 0.50
U 7.15 3.53 7.25 3.48
The frequency distribution of study time was positively skewed and this
was considerably improved by logarithmic transformation
Tr transformation, T logarithmically transformed, U untransformed
(original)
Fig. 2 Mean response time as a function of accessibility, involvement, and choice rationality (time in seconds)
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We further examined Greene and colleagues’ (2001) claim
that “emotional interference” produces longer response time for
emotionally incongruent responses. This prediction was only
confirmedwhen participants made a rational choice in response
to a moral dilemma under the condition of personal involve-
ment with partial information (e.g., judging it appropriate to
push the man off the footbridge in the footbridge dilemma).
In contrast, with full information presented, rational choices
were made faster. Therefore, our results suggest that any emo-
tional interference, with rational choices taking more time to
make, is an artifact of presenting partial information and does
not happen when full information is presented, with rational
choices taking less time. Given our results, a more plausible
interpretation of increased response time with rational answers
under conditions of partial information is reduced utilitarian
accessibility rather than “emotional interference”. When
decision-makers are presented with full contextual information
about a particular moral action and its consequences, the fram-
ing effect will be eliminated and mental simulation will not
entertain other possible outcomes of the scenario (e.g.,
FeldmanHall et al., 2012). Therefore, decision-makers aremore
vividly confronted with the effect of the action (whether per-
sonal or impersonal). It is plausible that limited utilitarian ac-
cessibility of moral actions and consequences results in a psy-
chological uncertainty and corresponding mental simulations
(compensating for reduced accessibility of moral actions and
consequences). In contrast, comprehensive information about
moral actions and consequences may eliminate uncertainty, and
boost utility maximization in moral choices, with rational
choices taking less time. Such an interpretation might be ac-
commodated by “situation models” (e.g., Glenberg, Meyer, &
Lindem, 1987), in which linguistic descriptions are understood
by simulating perceptual and motor aspects of those descrip-
tions. Therefore, more complete descriptions may facilitate
simulations by reducing uncertainty. Moreover, it is well
established by behavioral science theorists that decision uncer-
tainty induces human irrationality in choice (e.g., Kusev, van
Schaik, Ayton, Dent, & Chater, 2009; Kusev, van Schaik, &
Aldrovandi, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Our main finding is the effect of utilitarian accessibility on
judgment of appropriateness and response time. Therefore, we
agree withMcGuire et al.’s (2009) recommendation that “More
research needs to be done at a behavioral level in order to fine-
tune the questions being asked before work identifying the
neural correlates of moral decision-making can be useful” (p.
580).
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